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Abstract
At the same time that a dramatic plunge in energy commodities pressured companies in the energy sector to initiate a 
down-cycle drill by cutting capital expenditures, selling non-core assets, and laying off personnel, the world’s top produc-
ers still maintained over half a trillion dollars in liquid assets. The reasons for phenomena such as this in the global oil 
and gas sector are manifold. The research question for this composition is: What are the determinants, both financial and 
institutional, which drive oil and gas companies to hold a certain amount of cash on their balances? This paper aims to 
analyse these determinants in various geographical markets of the European continent over the period of 2010-2014, us-
ing models derived from both the ‘tradeoff ’ theory and the ‘pecking order’ theory. The empirical results from 800 firms 
were acquired with panel data regression analyses. They suggest that cash holdings in the sector are negatively affected 
by the net working capital, leverage, collateral, and firm size, while cash flows and capital expenditures have a positive 
influence on cash reserves. Besides the financial determinants, we also studied the institutional determinants for the cash 
levels. Our findings offer evidence that firms in countries with strong governance (as measured by the World Govern-
ance Index) hold more liquidity. Furthermore, the state of financial market development (as measured by the Global 
Financial Centers Index) is also positively related to cash holdings with the consequence that the financial market effect 
dominates the influence of governance. Our empirical evaluation will be of concern to managers in the oil and gas sector, 
who should take into consideration the settings of their companies when making corporate cash policy choices. 
Keywords: oil and gas companies, cash holdings, financial determinants, institutional determinants
JEL: G30, Q40 
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Introduction
During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, Warren 
Buffett made an emphatic public declaration from the 
widely read opinion pages of The New York Times. He 
warned the public that by holding cash it “opted for a ter-
rible long-term asset, one that pays virtually nothing and 
is certain to depreciate in value” [New York Times, 2008]. 
Interestingly enough, at the end of 2015, non-financial 
S&P 500 companies held $1.44 trillion in cash on their 
books [MarketWatch, 2015] and ever since the financial 
crisis, the record high cash holdings of American firms 
have been attracting significant media attention [Pinkow-
itz et al., 2013]. In continental Europe, the energy, auto-
mobile, telecom, and utility industries were the greatest 
liquidity hoarders holding €490 billion [FT, 2015].
In a world of perfect capital markets, a firm does not 
have the need to hold any cash at all, since it can obtain 
funding for its profitable investment projects at negligible 
transaction costs [Modigliani, Miller, 1958]. Thus, cash 
is merely viewed as negative debt, and hence, there is no 
optimal cash holding level. However, many international 
studies demonstrate that companies maintain sizeable 
portions of their assets in cash. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
found an average cash ratio of 15%. 
For the oil and gas sector, Antill and Arnott (2000) spot-
ted the trend of increasing cash holdings early. They noted 
that the inability of the industry to reinvest all of its free 
cash at a required profit forced it to develop net cash on 
their balance sheets. Even though a dramatic plunge in 
energy commodities pressured companies in the sector 
to initiate a down-cycle drill by cutting capital expendi-
tures, selling non-core assets, and laying off personnel, the 
world’s top producers still had over half a trillion dollars 
in liquid assets at the end of 2014 [Bloomberg, 2015]. 
Due to the importance of liquidity and its significant role 
in corporate financial management, various empirical 
studies have been conducted to explore the factors that in-
fluence it. The U.S. studies of Opler et al. (1999) and Kim et 
al. (1998) lend credence to the tradeoff theory, suggesting 
an optimal liquidity level that results from equalizing the 
marginal benefits of cash holdings to their marginal costs 
[Von Eije, 2012]. Firms increase their cash balances with 
business risks, capital expenditures, and financial market 
access constraints, while firm size, leverage, and dividend 
payments reduce cash holdings. The pecking order theory 
[Myers and Majluf, 1984] puts forward the contentious 
conclusion of zero target cash levels, viewing liquidity as a 
cushion between retained earnings and investment necessi-
ties. To decrease their financing costs, companies fund new 
projects primarily with retained earnings, then with safe 
debt and risky debt, and lastly with equity. Having ample 
operational cash flows at their disposal to finance their 
investments, a firm repays debt and accumulates cash. 
Recent studies using international samples have explored 
the relationship between cash holdings and countries’ 
institutional differences, as well as the level of financial 
market development. The vast majority of these studies 
[Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004] have 
confirmed the tradeoff theory and presented evidence 
that in countries with superior investor protection and a 
high quality of law enforcement companies tend to carry 
fewer liquid assets. However, there are some contradic-
tory results concerning the extent of the financial market 
development, as Ferreira and Vilela (2004) found that a 
higher level of financial development correlates with a 
negative impact on cash holdings, while Dittmar et al. 
(2003) observed a positive impact. 
Although corporate cash holding determinants have been 
the subject of many studies, scholars have predominantly 
focused on U.S. firms, while the empirical evidence of 
companies from various regions in Europe is not volumi-
nous. Additionally, it is not certain that acquired outputs 
can be generalized according to specific business sectors, 
since most previous studies are made across a number of 
various industries. This point highlights the importance 
of a sample selection. The selection from the oil and gas 
industry is particularly relevant, since this sector has been 
the world’s primary commercial energy supplier for many 
decades and is believed that its leading role will be pre-
served in the years to come [EIA, 2017]. Therefore, due to 
the magnitude of the industry, its unique nature of exten-
sive investments, and a notable need for external capital, 
we aim to provide new insights regarding the drivers of 
corporate cash holdings and whether this trend of money 
pileup in energy companies can be explained. 
We reevaluated the relation between cash holdings, a coun-
try’s institutional settings and the state of financial market 
development using a sample of 800 listed and unlisted en-
ergy firms from various geographical markets from the Eu-
ropean continent, considered over the period of 2010-2014. 
The underlying research question is: What are the determi-
nants, both financial and institutional, which drive oil and 
gas companies to hold a certain amount of cash on their 
balances? This paper contributes to the limited research 
on cash-holdings in the oil and gas sector.  As opposed to 
many previous studies that support a tradeoff view, our 
findings confirmed that both the tradeoff and pecking or-
der models are essential in explaining the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings. We show that companies from the 
oil and gas sector in countries with a stronger institutional 
framework and developed financial markets hold more 
liquidity when compared to firms operating in countries 
with weaker governance regimes. We also find that the level 
of capital market development is positively related with 
cash holdings, indicating that oil and gas companies hold 
more cash when they can do so. 
The structure of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 
highlights the underlying financial theory and arguments 
as to why a company may opt to hold cash. Section 3 
introduces the methodology and the data sample. Every 
variable deployed was given a detailed description, as well 
as an explanation regarding the applicability of the select-
ed variables to our study. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Section 5 summarizes the results and suggests 
directions for further empirical research.
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Theoretical framework
In the following section, we present the prevailing 
theories on corporate cash holdings. As there are numer-
ous and sometimes contradictory financial ideas on the 
matter, we limit the scope of this review to our underlying 
assumptions about the topic. We begin by featuring some 
financial theories, then proceed to elaborate on the possi-
ble reasons for holding cash, and lastly, we present some 
outlines of recent research.
Theory and empirical hypotheses
Irrelevance of cash holdings
In a world of efficient capital markets, there is no incen-
tive to hold any liquidity as, once needed, it can be drawn 
from markets without hindrance and at a reasonable 
price [Opler et al., 1999]. Consequently, in the absence of 
a liquidity premium, cash holdings have no opportunity 
cost and do not maximize shareholder wealth. According 
to the classic Modigliani-Miller theory, the market value 
of a company has no dependence on its financing struc-
ture. In a world of perfect and frictionless capital markets, 
firms are always able to secure funding for their present 
positive net value projects so cash reserves are irrelevant. 
In practice, companies operate in imperfect markets and 
as a result, there are valid reasons for why they may opt 
to carry liquidity on their balance sheets and not consider 
external financing as a perfect substitute for internal ones. 
Tradeoff theory 
According to the tradeoff theory, companies establish 
their optimal level of liquidity by weighing the marginal 
costs and benefits of holding cash [Ferreira and Vilela, 
2004].  The primary cost associated with cash holdings 
is frequently called the cost-of-carry and results from an 
inferior return relative to other investments of the same 
risk. The benefits of having ample liquidity balances arise 
from two motives: transaction cost concerns and precau-
tionary intent [Dittmar et al., 2003]. 
Tobin (1956) found that corporate cash balances are 
dependent on the transaction costs that a company is 
exposed to while converting non-cash financial assets 
into cash. Due to the economies of scale, large firms carry 
less liquidity. Later, Mulligan (1997) confirmed that big 
companies tend to hold less cash as a percentage of sales 
compared to small companies. The transaction cost mo-
tive also considers the charges for obtaining external fi-
nancing. In the presence of a liquid asset shortage, a firm 
will have to choose between various options: dividend 
and investment reduction, asset sale or borrowing funds 
in capital markets, with the latter being the more pre-
ferred choice [Opler et al., 1999]. The expenses attached 
to accessing the financial market prompt the company 
to resort to external financing less often and to hold an 
optimal amount of cash as a buffer [Kim et al., 1998]. 
Companies with better investment prospects are assumed 
to be in possession of larger liquid reserves in order to 
pursue the optimal investment policy and therefore the 
level of capital spending should be positively related to 
cash balances (Dittmar et al., 2003). Bates et al. (2009) 
pointed to the substitution effect of working capital due 
to its relatively simple and quick transformation features: 
firms with large numbers of working capital tend to have 
less cash. 
The precautionary motive is regarded as a preventative 
measure against unforeseen circumstances.  The mitiga-
tion of the costs of financial distress compels firms to hold 
ample funds in terms of liquidity and in readily available 
lines of credit. Opler et al. (1999) highlight the advantage 
of keeping a portion of capital in the form of liquid assets, 
since it helps avoid passing on profitable projects due to a 
liquidity shortage. 
Pecking order theory
Numerous market imperfections increase the costs of 
external financing. Donaldson (1961) observed the 
substantial inclination of management towards internal 
generation as a source of new funds. In case the need for 
external financing prevailed, management seldom turned 
to issuing equity, regarding debt as a more preferable 
option. As an extension, Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) set the framework in the context of the 
rational expectation equilibrium. Since a seller exercises 
an informational advantage over a buyer, in the absence of 
all integral information regarding the state of the firm, the 
providers of capital will demand a premium for investing 
in or granting credit to an entity. Thus, to minimize asym-
metric information and other financing costs, manage-
ment will give preference to retained earnings first, then 
to debt, and lastly to equity. 
Such a hierarchy of financial policies gained widespread 
recognition as the pecking order theory. Presented with 
sharp adverse selection costs, a company might pass on 
accepting value-creating projects, because it will not prove 
able to raise the necessary funds. As a viable response 
to this scenario, aiming to circumvent adverse selection 
costs and to not pass on positive NPV projects, a firm may 
choose to bulk up its financial slack (Myers, 1984). For oil 
companies, Chen (2016) provides evidence of a “peck-
ing order” existing in relation to cash flows.  Firms that 
are constrained primarily deploy their cash flows for the 
accruement of cash reserves, while unconstrained firms 
direct their cash flows towards discharging liabilities and 
arranging a share repurchase program once positive cash 
flow shocks occur. 
Institutions and macroeconomic exposure
Scholars have started focusing more on how formal 
and informal institutions, called “rules of the game”, are 
influencing the organizational and commercial behaviour 
of companies [North, 1991; Scott, 2014]. Drawing on 
original research, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue 
that inclusive political institutions provide incentives for 
capital investments and economic growth. According to 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006), political and legal systems 
substantially contribute to company activity. 
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Bae and Goyal (2006) showed that the protection of 
creditor and property rights largely decreases the costs of 
raising funds from banks. Extending credit in economies 
with underdeveloped governance constitutes a significant 
expropriation threat, which ends up contracting the local 
credit distribution [Seifert and Gonenc, 2016]. Thus, 
strong country governance with a widely recognized rule 
of law and vigorously pursued creditor rights promote 
lower liquidity holdings within firms, while in riskier 
economies, companies would opt to hold more cash as a 
safeguard against adverse shocks [Pinkowitz et al., 2006].
Determinants of cash holdings 
Financial determinants
Collateral is pledged against a loan in order to secure fi-
nancing. Von Eije (2012) suggests that the manufacturing 
characteristics of a firm are likely to serve as collateral for 
debt issues. Berger and Udell (1998) point out that credi-
tors often expect riskier borrowers to provide security for 
their loans. Covered loans to the oil and gas industry are 
deemed to be less risky compared to unsecured bonds, 
which could bring near-complete losses [Bloomberg, 
2016]. Firms in possession of low collateral value assets 
are up against significant challenges in sourcing an exter-
nal finance supply, forcing companies to reserve liquidity. 
Thus, we expect to find a negative link between cash 
holdings and collateralizable assets.
A company’s cash holdings could be regarded as retained 
historical cash flows. Given the volatility of moderate cash 
flow, a high, current cash flow should translate to relative-
ly high cash holdings, yielding a positive relation between 
the two. Additionally, according to the pecking order the-
ory, companies will resort to internally generated funding 
before going to the external capital market. Therefore, 
large cash flows will be consistent with higher cash hold-
ings, as confirmed by Opler et al. (1999). However, Kim 
et al. (1998) argue that cash flow provides an additional 
source of liquidity, viewing it as a cash substitute. There-
fore, the relation should be negative. Consequently, the 
estimated relationship between cash holdings and cash 
flow is ambiguous.
Seifert and Gonenc (2016) found that company size holds 
an inverse relation to cash holdings, since larger firms are 
more predisposed to easier borrowing terms and effective-
ly are spared from keeping excessive liquidity. Larger firms 
display fewer articulate information asymmetries and 
lower adverse selection costs since they are generally well 
developed, have established disclosure procedures, and 
capture more of market’s attention. In addition, due to the 
economies of scale in obtaining external capital, smaller 
firms face higher financing costs prompting them to hold 
more liquidity [Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004]. Moreover, larger 
firms tend to be more diversified and thereby experience 
lower risk of going into financial distress, supporting the 
idea that smaller firms should hold more cash [Titman and 
Wessels, 1988]. Thus, we may assume the expected impact 
of firm size on cash holdings to be negative.
The fundamental advantage of corporate liquidity is its 
function as internal funding for value creating projects. In 
a pecking order environment, debt is expected to increase 
within a company when investment surpasses the retained 
earnings and to decrease when investment is less than 
the retained earnings. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggest 
that cash holdings should correspondingly adhere to an 
inverse dynamic. Cash balances are reduced when invest-
ments exceed the retained earnings and rise once invest-
ments are less than the retained earnings. In this manner, 
such a notion justifies the assumption of an inverse 
relation between cash and leverage. In much the same 
way, Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) also lend credence to an inverse relation 
between leverage and cash holdings considering that com-
panies can issue debt to generate cash when internal funds 
are small. However, this indebtedness also increases the 
probability of financial distress, forcing the accumulation 
of liquid resources. This could be viewed as a hedging tool 
[Acharya et al., 2007], which leads to a positive impact. 
Hence, the estimated relationship between cash holdings 
and leverage is ambiguous.
In an environment of volatile oil prices, tighter regula-
tions and intense pressure from shareholders, oil and 
gas companies have been focusing meticulously on cash 
and working capital management by aiming to increase 
returns and to deliver a satisfactory cash flow to support 
investments and dividends [EY, 2014]. Working capi-
tal aids the industry by tapping into valuable liquidity 
resources and the optimization of this working capital 
is able to unlock the cash to support itself and invest for 
the future [PwC, 2015]. Opler et al. (1999) found that net 
working capital may serve as a substitute for cash and 
could be readily and relatively efficiently converted into 
liquidity once the need arises. Therefore, we expect to ob-
serve negative relations between the liquid asset holdings 
and net working capital.
Previous studies on cash holdings have shown mixed 
results regarding capital outlays. For instance, Mikkel-
son and Partch (2002) found that high cash reserves are 
accompanied by greater investments, while Kalcheva 
and Lins (2007) observed companies with larger capital 
expenditure holding less liquidity. In general, the tradeoff 
theory predicts a positive relationship between capital 
expenditures and cash holdings, since firms increase their 
cash balances to finance capital expenditures, while the 
pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship as 
companies primarily finance their investment projects 
with accumulated cash [Dittmar et al., 2003]. Therefore, 
the relation between capital expenditures and liquidity 
reserves is equivocal. 
Institutional determinants
Strong governance ensures better property right protec-
tion by enforcing business contracts and it also improves 
lenders’ confidence, as the probability of loan repayment 
and collateral repossession increases [Ayyagari et al., 
2010]. Sound governance regimes contribute to lower 
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liquidity holdings within firms by reducing uncertainty 
[Seifert and Gonenc, 2016], while in riskier economies, 
companies tend to reserve liquidity as a precautionary 
measure [Pinkowitz et al., 2006]. Consequently, we ex-
pected to find a negative relationship between the quality 
of a country’s institutional framework and the cash hold-
ings of companies.
For the industry, access to developed financial markets 
is of prominent importance. Even at times when the oil 
price was above $100 per barrel, major oil firms routine-
ly needed to raise capital to cover their outlays [WSJ, 
2015]. Besides internal actions to raise liquidity, whether 
through capital expenditure cuts, reductions in dividend 
distributions and headcount contraction, energy firms 
regularly turn to external sources via debt or equity of-
ferings. According to Brogan (2015), small-cap explorers 
usually resort to equity issuance, whereas midcap to large-
cap independent oil and gas producers are the largest 
users of reserve-based lending facilities from banks. Big 
international oil firms heavily rely on the support from 
banks, infrastructure funds, pension funds, and other 
institutions.
Fewer developed financial markets provide a limited 
credit supply and higher transaction costs for obtaining 
additional financial resources, which ultimately results 
in firms hoarding more cash [Ferreira and Vilela, 2004]. 
Better access to finance decreases the marginal value of 
cash, reducing the necessity to hold a large amount of 
precautionary liquidity [Faulkender and Wang, 2006].  
Therefore, we expected to observe an inverse relationship 
between cash holdings and country’s capital market state. 
However, as noted by La Porta et al. (1997), countries with 
strong governance mechanisms, as indicated by the legal 
framework and quality of law enforcement, have better 
developed financial markets. Thus, we employed models 
that assess the impact of both factors on cash holdings 
and allow the comparison of their role in explaining cash 
reserves. See Table 1 for a summary of the above.
Table 1. Determinants of Cash Holdings
Variable Relation with cash holdings Explanation
Firm size Negative Economies of scale, financial constraints
Collateralizable value of assets Negative Ease of securing credit
Cash flow Negative/Positive
Ready source of liquidity/
Preference for financing with internal sources 
Leverage Negative/Positive
Increased funding costs/ 
Avoidance of financial distress
Financial market development Negative Ease of access to external financing
Country governance Negative Uncertainty reduction
Capital Expenditures Negative/Positive
Decrease of internal funds/ 
Investment support
Net working capital Negative Source of additional liquidity
Hypothesis development
In view of the above, we constructed hypotheses related 
to corporate cash holdings that were subsequently tested 
and analyzed. Cash holdings in the oil and gas industry 
were estimated by applying the factors found to influence 
the cash policies of non-energy companies: collateraliza-
ble value of assets, cash flow, firm size, leverage, country 
governance, capital market development, and net working 
capital. We will use these explanatory attributes as proxies 
for the determinants of cash holdings. 
H1: Corporate cash holdings are inversely related to firm size
H2: Corporate cash holdings are inversely related to the 
firm’s collateralizable assets
H3: Corporate cash holdings are inversely related to the 
firm’s cash flow
H4: Corporate cash holdings are inversely related to firm 
leverage 
H5: Corporate cash holdings are inversely related to the 
firm’s net working capital
H6: Corporate cash holdings are positively related to the 
firm’s capital expenditures 
H7: Corporate cash holdings are lower in countries with 
strong governance
H8: Corporate cash holdings are lower in developed 
financial markets
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Methodology  
and data collection
In this section, we describe the dataset that was used as 
well as our variables and methodology. We bring into 
focus the quantifiable observations that can be examined 
statistically and produce solid generalizations.
Sample and Data
In order to carry out the practical part of the research, we 
collected secondary data from the ORBIS database, com-
piled by the Bureau Van Dijk. The database includes infor-
mation on firms around the world, derived from their 
annual financial statements. In a few particular occur-
rences, we used primary data obtained directly from the 
annual reports. The sample includes listed and non-listed 
oil and gas companies (NACE codes 061, 0610, 06, 0620, 
091, 0910, 495, 4950, 3523) from 33 European countries 
between the years of 2010-2014. Companies that relo-
cated their nominal registration to other jurisdiction or 
subsidiaries of foreign firms were excluded. The countries 
that are presented vary in their institutional and economi-
cal aspects. Some were left out as companies from a sector 
that were lacking in some aspect. 
After the corresponding criteria were applied, we pro-
ceeded to do a panel construction consisting of 800 firms 
representing 4,000 firms in total from yearlong observa-
tions. The sample firms meet the following criteria: (a) 
they possess more than $20 million in total assets; (b) 
have a turnover of more than $1 million; and (c) hold 
more than $0.5 million worth of cash reserves. Predom-
inantly, we needed variables such as the total assets, 
tangible assets, working capital and cash holdings to be 
positive, as well as any other variable defined as positive. 
The data covering the governance issues was acquired 
from the World Bank World Governance Index website 
and the information on the capital market from the Z/Yen 
Group and their Global Financial Centers Index.
As a measure of country-level governance, the World 
Governance Index (WGI) aggregates six key dimensions 
of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The Global 
Financial Centers Index (GFCI) was obtained from a pub-
lishing agency website. This index encompasses two blocks:  
instrumental factors and financial center assessments. 
Instrumental factors consist of five broad areas constituting 
the competitiveness of a capital market: Business Environ-
ment, Financial Sector Development, Infrastructure, Hu-
man Capital, Reputational and General Factors. The World 
Bank, The Economist Intelligence Unit, the OECD and the 
United Nations provided these quantitative measures. Sup-
plementarily, we involved other firm characteristics, which 
we anticipated would influence cash reserves. 
Variable construction
 Analogous with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we employed 
the variable CASH1, constructed as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to total assets. We also used the 
variable CASH2, which is identical to CASH1 except that 
the denominator is computed as the total assets minus the 
cash and cash equivalents [Opler et al., 1999]. Higher val-
ues of these variables will denote higher levels of liquidity 
within the company. Similarly to Titman and Wessels 
(1988), we used two proxies for size: SIZE1 was estimated 
as the natural logarithm for sales and SIZE2 as the natural 
logarithm for total assets. Capital market development 
(GFCI) was calculated by considering data from The 
Global Financial Centers Index. For leverage (LEV), we 
used the total debt to total assets. We measured capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) as capital expenditures to total 
assets. Net working capital (NWC) was estimated as the 
net current assets minus cash. Cash flow was considered 
as the pre-tax profits plus depreciation over sales (CF1) or 
total assets (CF2). Collateralizable assets (COLL) were a 
proxy for the collateral firm’s need to secure the loan and 
were calculated as tangible assets over total assets.  The 
measures of the country institutional framework charac-
teristics (WGI) were governance scores obtained from the 
World Governance Index. For more on the definitions of 
the variables mentioned see Table 2 below.
Table 2.  Description of Variables
Name Definition
Cash holdings (CASH1) Cash + Marketable securities/Total assets
Cash holdings (CASH2) Cash + Marketable securities/Total assets − (Cash + Marketable securities)
Size (SIZE1) ln (Sales)
Size (SIZE2) ln (Assets)
Leverage (LEV) Total debt/Shareholders equity
Cash flow (CF1) Pre-tax profits + Depreciation/Sales
Cash flow (CF2) Pre-tax profits + Depreciation/Total assets
Net Working Capital (NWC) (Working capital − (Cash + Marketable securities))/Total assets
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) Capital expenditures/Total assets
Capital market development (GFCI) ln (GFCI)
Collateralizable assets (COLL) Tangible assets/Total assets
Institutional Governance (WGI) ln (WGI)
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Regression model specification
Since the data in our research encloses both time series 
and cross-sectional elements, the particular set of data 
would be known as a panel of data. We ran regressions 
with country-fixed effects, institutional framework 
characteristics, and the rating of the largest and near-
est financial center respectively. Our final regressions 
employed both of the macro-level factors. All models 
were estimated using OLS regressions with the Hu-
ber-White-Sandwich robust variance-covariance esti-
mator (VCE). The standard errors reported are robust 




Table A1 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics 
for cash holdings on a country by country base. Summa-
ry statistics are presented below. The average values of 
a cash-to-assets ratio of 12% shown in Table 3 resemble 
those reported by Damodaran (2005) for U.S. oil and gas 
companies. The same goes for the mean leverage results 
(48%). Additionally, the variability of governance (WGI) 
and financial market development ratings (GFCI) in 
Table 4 are, respectively, a bit smaller and somewhat more 
variable over time. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for firm-level variables   
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Percentile 25 Median Percentile 75 Valid N
CASH1 .12 .14 .03 .07 .15 4785
CASH2 .23 1.89 .03 .07 .18 4785
SIZE1 12.37 1.81 10.94 11.95 13.37 4785
SIZE2 12.36 2.17 11.18 12.35 13.51 4572
LEV .48 .26 .28 .49 .66 860
CF1 -5.22 175.01 .01 .07 .23 3788
CF2 -.26 22.18 .04 .08 .15 3907
CAPEX -.099 .133 -.151 -.085 -.039 672
NWC .00 .26 -.09 .00 .12 4785
COLL .32 .29 .03 .25 .55 4758
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for country-level variables   
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Percentile 25 Median Percentile 75 Valid N
voice_accountability 79.0 23.2 75.1 91.9 93.4 4785
Polstab 63.0 22.1 57.3 63.5 76.8 4785
Goveff 79.2 19.1 67.3 89.6 92.8 4785
Regqual 80.5 19.0 74.9 86.7 94.8 4785
Rulelaw 77.1 23.7 63.0 90.1 94.2 4785
Corrupt 74.2 26.7 58.1 90.0 93.4 4785
WGI 75.5 21.5 67.2 86.4 89.3 4785
GFCI 634.4 87.8 581.0 629.0 677.0 4767
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Table 5. The effects of financial factors, WGI and GFCI on cash holdings
  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
cash1 cash1 cash1 cash1 cash1 cash2 cash2 cash2 cash2 cash2
SIZE1 -0.00375**       -0.00512*** -0.0173***       -0.0247***
(0.00180) (0.00192) (0.00622) (0.00779)
LEV -0.165*** -0.172*** -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.166*** -0.429*** -0.472*** -0.449*** -0.455*** -0.422***
(0.0244) (0.0257) (0.0249) (0.0306) (0.0227) (0.0793) (0.0908) (0.0858) (0.107) (0.0734)
CF1 -0.00000869*** -0.00000623* 0.0000212 0.0000308*
(0.00000321) (0.00000363) (0.0000154) (0.0000177)
NWC -0.242*** -0.251*** -0.236*** -0.229*** -0.222*** -0.650*** -0.701*** -0.644*** -0.695*** -0.578***
(0.0334) (0.0345) (0.0350) (0.0409) (0.0313) (0.130) (0.145) (0.139) (0.176) (0.115)
COLL -0.150*** -0.155*** -0.164*** -0.176*** -0.166*** -0.467*** -0.492*** -0.525*** -0.618*** -0.508***
(0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0209) (0.0252) (0.0188) (0.0874) (0.0941) (0.101) (0.130) (0.0820)
WGI 0.000212 0.000297 0.000264 0.000127 0.000183 -0.000976 -0.000475 -0.000553 -0.000903 -0.00105*
(0.000207) (0.000203) (0.000203) (0.000236) (0.000207) (0.000607) (0.000509) (0.000512) (0.000635) (0.000605)
GFCI 0.000128*** 0.000116** 0.000115** 0.000145*** 0.000141*** 0.000697*** 0.000637*** 0.000627*** 0.000783*** 0.000706***
(0.0000492) (0.0000472) (0.0000466) (0.0000532) (0.0000476) (0.000208) (0.000192) (0.000189) (0.000221) (0.000188)
SIZE2 -0.00142 -0.00326** -0.00557*** -0.00465 -0.0110** -0.0154***
(0.00157) (0.00163) (0.00192) (0.00400) (0.00434) (0.00554)
CF2 0.0976*** 0.113*** 0.0851** 0.378*** 0.404*** 0.372**
(0.0374) (0.0380) (0.0360) (0.138) (0.144) (0.144)
CAPEX 0.157** 0.516**
(0.0609) (0.238)
Constant 0.211*** 0.182*** 0.202*** 0.249*** 0.225*** 0.466*** 0.309*** 0.374*** 0.463*** 0.552***
  (0.0342) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0419) (0.0356) (0.0958) (0.0849) (0.0871) (0.110) (0.110)
N 758 758 758 591 807 758 758 758 591 807
R2 0.261 0.258 0.267 0.317 0.281 0.158 0.154 0.162 0.195 0.167
adj. R2 0.254 0.251 0.260 0.308 0.275 0.150 0.146 0.154 0.184 0.160
AIC -1184.3 -1181.7 -1190.5 -883.2 -1149.8 1013.3 1016.8 1009.6 903.3 1213.0
BIC -1147.3 -1144.7 -1153.5 -843.8 -1112.3 1050.3 1053.8 1046.7 942.7 1250.5
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Regression models
The standard errors in our first set of models are not 
seriously inflated by the collinearity among regressors. 
Adding CAPEX improves the models, but CAPEX is 
missing for some of the companies, which decreases the 
sample size. Country fixed effects were included into all 
the models, but are statistically significant (p<0.05) only 
for the models explaining CASH1, and not for the models 
of CASH2. We found that some unobserved country-spe-
cific characteristics are able to influence CASH1, which 
points to the possibility of including institutional frame-
work measures. We do so with the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) as possible determinants. These indica-
tors are highly correlated with one another. Consequently, 
similarly to Seifert and Gonenc (2015), we averaged them 
out across all six items. Controlling for firm character-
istics, the WGI is significantly positively associated with 
cash holdings (p < 0.01). We cannot rule out the possibil-
ity of the presence of other country-specific factors such 
as certain laws and regulations that are difficult to account 
for in modeling. Indeed, we found that financial develop-
ment does also matter. 
 Our further discussion will be based on the models that 
accounted for firm characteristics, governance character-
istics and financial market development as presented in 
Table 5 below. It could be argued that the financial market 
ratings vary by year and thus, there may be some sort 
of variable bias that was omitted and was caused by not 
accounting for time effects.  However, the parameter esti-
mates for the last set of regressions with time-fixed effects 




In line with Hypothesis 1, firm size (SIZE1 and SIZE2), 
denoted either as total sales or as total assets, has a 
negative coefficient with a varying significance, which 
is consistent with the idea that larger firms can access 
capital markets more easily and thus do not need to hold 
much cash. The negative relationship lends credence to 
the tradeoff argument, previously supported by Opler et 
al. (1999), Kim et al. (1998) as well as Seifert and Gonenc 
(2016). Smaller oil and gas companies with less operation-
al flexibility have limited access to liquidity via public or 
private capital markets, while bigger energy companies 
are provided relatively easy access to cheap debt financing 
[Powell, 2015]. J.P. Morgan’s (2015) research also attests 
that the size and scale of oil and gas companies are the key 
determinants of their credit quality. A larger size helps 
companies to move into higher rating categories and leads 
to better credit access.
The significant negative relationship between collateraliz-
able assets and cash holdings confirms the evidence from 
a European study by Martínez-Carrascal (2010) confirm-
ing Hypothesis 2. Since the proportion of tangible assets 
in a firm’s balance sheets is a variable linked to their access 
to external finance, this negative relationship results 
in easier access to external financing when a company 
applies for a loan, which is largely in line with tradeoff 
arguments. For the oil and gas sector, reserve interests and 
operational cost intensive equipment help to establish the 
loan amount and steer the availability of funds. Therefore, 
oil and gas companies that have a strong balance sheet to 
incur debt at cost-efficient rates can effectively manage 
their capital agenda [Bloomberg, 2016].
Hypothesis 3 was rejected. We found a significant rela-
tionship opposite to what we hypothesized. Similarly to 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004), the sign of cash flow to the 
asset (CF2) coefficient was positive, which contradicts the 
tradeoff argument, but supports the pecking order theory. 
In line with Saddour’s research on French firms (2006), 
cash balances increase along with cash flow levels, since 
companies can use their cash flow as a liquidity substi-
tution for finance investments. Therefore, as with other 
companies, oil and gas firms primarily fund themselves 
internally with cash flow and externally with debt [J.P. 
Morgan, 2015]. Findings by Chen (2016) also suggest that 
oil companies build up cash reserves from cash flows. As 
noted by Gavrilenkov et al. (2013), oil companies have 
great influence over their cash management policy design 
and can fine-tune conditions to given circumstances to 
have a ready source of liquidity. 
Our findings confirmed Hypothesis 4. Pursuant to Kim 
et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) 
and Seifert and Gonenc (2016), leverage (LEV) signifi-
cantly negatively impacts cash holdings, suggesting that 
highly leveraged companies resort to lower cash balances. 
The pecking order theory stipulates a negative relation 
between cash holdings and leverage: when investment 
needs outstrip their internal funds, firms issue new debt. 
In such a manner, once cash holdings fall, the leverage in-
creases. Developments in oil and gas capital spending and 
production confirm this. Firms substantially increased 
their investment outlays in order to finance the expansion 
of production capacity and to facilitate new project devel-
opment [EIA, 2016] that could not be financed entirely 
through internal funds.
In the results, the negative attribute of the NWC coef-
ficients is similar to those documented in Opler et al. 
(1999) and Bates et al. (2009), which supports Hypothesis 
5. It is consistent with the tradeoff model that regards 
working capital as a substitute for cash holdings, since 
such readily obtainable assets other than cash can be 
liquidated in the event of a liquidity shortage. Indeed, as 
reported by EY (2014), companies from the oil and gas 
sector have been progressively focusing their attention 
on cash and working capital management, in an attempt 
to increase the returns on capital and to deliver sufficient 
cash flow to support investments. There is a rising aware-
ness of how much value is left out because of the previous 
small focus on working capital management and the firms 
have to operate in a lower surplus cash environment.
Contrary to the observations of Kalcheva and Lins (2007), 
who found cash to be negatively related to capital ex-
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penditures, the relationship was positive and significant in 
our sample, which is in line with Hypothesis 6.  This sug-
gests that oil and gas companies increase their cash levels 
in order to finance capital expenditures. Largely consistent 
with Mikkelson and Partch (2002), the cash balances of 
energy companies should be sufficient to cover investment 
programs. This positive relation is consistent with firms 
who are building up a substantial buffer of immediately 
available liquidity for precautionary reasons.
Institutional determinants
We reported evidence that companies from the oil and gas 
sector in countries with a stronger institutional frame-
work (WGI) hold more cash compared to firms operating 
in countries with weaker governance regimes. Therefore, 
we rejected Hypothesis 7, as the findings contradict our 
initial expectations and the empirical evidence of Dittmar 
et al. (2003) and Seifert and Gonenc (2016). The results 
are in line with Caprio et al. (2013), who also found a 
positive relation between government quality and cor-
porate cash holdings. In a global sample, they found that 
quality governance governments tend to hold back from 
expropriation actions, and thus companies can hold more 
liquidity with less fear of government seizure. Conversely, 
consistent with the precautionary motive, companies tend 
to shelter cash holdings from expropriation by carrying 
lower cash balances and channeling liquidity into less ex-
posed tangible assets. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2014) also 
arrived at largely resembling findings.
Hypothesis 8 was also rejected, as we found the level of 
capital market development (GFCI)  was positively related 
with cash holdings, which is contrary to Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), but consistent with Dittmar et al. (2003). 
Oil and gas companies hold more cash in developed 
capital markets and liquidity balances do not seem to be 
determined by the failure to draw external financing. This 
behavior could be explained by precautionary reasons 
(Opler et al., 1999). Firms hold excess cash to ensure that 
they will retain the ability to invest when cash flow is too 
low, compared to investment requirements. The results 
also suggest that the financial market effect dominates 
the governance effect, meaning that cash holdings in this 
sector are clearly more sensitive to financial market devel-
opment levels than to governance factors. 
Conclusions
We explored the determinants of cash holdings for oil and 
gas firms in Europe, using panel data for the period of 
2010-2014. We modeled the cash-to-asset ratio as a func-
tion of the company and country features. Similar to pre-
vious observations [Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004; Bates et al., 2009], our findings suggest that the cash 
balances held by oil and gas firms are negatively affected 
by firm size, the amount of liquid asset substitutes, as well 
as leverage and they also have positive relations with firm 
capital expenditures. These findings are largely in line 
with the tradeoff reasoning that the optimal level of cash 
holdings is the result of firms stacking up the marginal 
costs against the benefits of carrying liquid balances.
This is primarily applicable in the oil and gas sector, where 
intrinsic forecasting challenges make holding a substan-
tial buffer of immediately available funds of paramount 
importance. Consistent with Ferreira and Vilela (2004), 
and Saddour (2006), we found a positive relation between 
cash flow and cash holdings, which supports the pecking 
order theory. So we can assume that both the tradeoff and 
pecking order theories provide a valid interpretation of 
the determinants for cash holdings in oil and gas compa-
nies. 
We provided evidence that firms in countries with strong 
governance hold more cash. This is in line with the find-
ings of Caprio et al. (2013), who suggest that in countries 
with poor governance, firms shelter assets from state 
expropriation by keeping less liquidity, which is more 
vulnerable to expropriation than illiquid tangible assets 
(Myers and Rajan, 1998). The level of financial market 
development is positively related to cash reserves, with the 
financial market effect dominating the governance effect, 
which is likely to be indicative of the industry’s immense 
appetite for capital.
With this contribution, we showed that managers should 
take into consideration the settings of their companies 
when making corporate cash policy choices. We look 
forward to promoting further research on cash holdings 
in oil and gas companies. It could be viable in future 
works examining whether the cash ratios of listed oil 
and gas companies significantly vary in comparison to 
those of their unlisted peers, as earlier evidenced by Von 
Eije (2012) for an international sample of manufacturing 
firms. Also, we have not explored whether the perfor-
mance of oil and gas companies with large cash holdings 
differs from that of firms with lower liquidity balances. 
Therefore, analyzing the consequences of the high cash 
reserves of energy companies in an international setting is 
certainly a notable area for future research. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Summary statistics by country: cash holdings
 
cash1 cash2
Mean SD Perc. 25 Median Perc. 75 Mean SD Perc. 25 Median Perc. 75
AT (Austria) 0.149 0.129 0.052 0.11 0.206 0.21 0.23 0.055 0.124 0.259
BA (Bosnia-Herze-
govina) 0.059 0.026 0.034 0.058 0.08 0.063 0.03 0.035 0.062 0.087
BE (Belgium) 0.13 0.106 0.049 0.089 0.184 0.17 0.176 0.051 0.098 0.225
BG (Bulgaria) 0.102 0.076 0.029 0.102 0.144 0.122 0.101 0.03 0.114 0.169
CH (Switzerland) 0.191 0.136 0.092 0.173 0.285 0.273 0.233 0.102 0.21 0.399
CY (Cyprus) 0.068 0.048 0.037 0.062 0.078 0.076 0.059 0.039 0.067 0.084
CZ (Czech Republic) 0.079 0.086 0.023 0.057 0.086 0.099 0.137 0.024 0.061 0.094
DE (Germany) 0.15 0.157 0.045 0.096 0.205 0.257 0.485 0.047 0.106 0.258
DK (Denmark) 0.146 0.047 0.111 0.144 0.149 0.174 0.067 0.124 0.169 0.175
EE (Estonia) 0.062 0.079 0.024 0.038 0.066 0.076 0.129 0.025 0.04 0.071
ES (Spain) 0.09 0.108 0.029 0.056 0.102 0.123 0.214 0.029 0.059 0.113
FI (Finland) 0.021 0.022 0.006 0.009 0.04 0.022 0.024 0.006 0.009 0.042
FR (France) 0.13 0.14 0.034 0.081 0.183 0.203 0.365 0.035 0.088 0.224
GB (Great Britain) 0.151 0.177 0.033 0.082 0.197 0.316 0.804 0.034 0.089 0.245
GR (Greece) 0.096 0.084 0.046 0.077 0.104 0.118 0.131 0.049 0.083 0.116
HR (Croatia) 0.048 0.045 0.015 0.029 0.073 0.053 0.054 0.015 0.03 0.079
HU (Hungary) 0.084 0.094 0.017 0.054 0.115 0.106 0.146 0.018 0.057 0.131
IE (Ireland) 0.172 0.24 0.025 0.072 0.225 0.989 3.105 0.026 0.077 0.29
IT (Italy) 0.087 0.115 0.023 0.048 0.098 0.321 4.883 0.024 0.05 0.109
LI (Liechtenstein) 0.236 0.067 0.221 0.267 0.277 0.316 0.107 0.284 0.363 0.382
LT (Lithuania) 0.073 0.05 0.038 0.057 0.1 0.082 0.063 0.039 0.06 0.111
LU (Luxembourg) 0.167 0.182 0.034 0.083 0.274 0.278 0.377 0.035 0.09 0.412
LV (Latvia) 0.112 0.081 0.052 0.088 0.127 0.136 0.119 0.055 0.096 0.146
MT (Malta) 0.02 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.022 0.02 0.005 0.017 0.018 0.022
NL (Netherlands) 0.151 0.156 0.031 0.089 0.234 0.235 0.325 0.032 0.098 0.306
NO (Norway) 0.117 0.147 0.019 0.06 0.155 0.21 0.567 0.019 0.064 0.184
PL (Poland) 0.108 0.101 0.037 0.06 0.162 0.138 0.158 0.039 0.064 0.193
PT (Portugal) 0.044 0.04 0.014 0.027 0.083 0.048 0.046 0.014 0.028 0.091
RO (Romania) 0.056 0.077 0.016 0.029 0.059 0.069 0.128 0.017 0.03 0.063
RS (Serbia) 0.033 0.04 0.003 0.015 0.061 0.036 0.045 0.003 0.015 0.065
RU (Russia) 0.079 0.095 0.017 0.042 0.108 0.103 0.172 0.017 0.044 0.121
SE (Sweden) 0.064 0.044 0.027 0.062 0.091 0.071 0.053 0.028 0.066 0.101
SI (Slovenia) 0.035 0.023 0.012 0.041 0.054 0.037 0.025 0.012 0.043 0.057
SK (Slovak Republic) 0.095 0.074 0.042 0.058 0.13 0.112 0.101 0.044 0.062 0.15
TR (Turkey) 0.151 0.173 0.02 0.077 0.229 0.267 0.498 0.02 0.084 0.297
UA (Ukraine) 0.08 0.087 0.015 0.053 0.124 0.099 0.131 0.015 0.055 0.141
